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: Virtual Child Pornography

VIRTUAL CHILD PORNOGRAPHY LAWS AND THE CONSTRAINTS
IMPOSED BY THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Paula Bird1
I. INTRODUCTION
“If we don’t stand up for children, then we don’t stand for much.”2 This
sentiment is a resounding example of how we, as a society, feel about the
protection of our children. Stories of the abuse and exploitation of children strike
at our hearts, and move us to safeguard those who are vulnerable. It provokes us to
punish those who dare to harm them. It comes as no surprise, then, that lawmakers
have crafted stringent laws directed against the production, distribution, and
possession of child pornography.3 Unfortunately, however, the easy accessibility
and increasing popularity of the internet has cleared a path for computer crimes,
including the distribution, possession, and, with the powers of computer animation,
even creation of child pornography.4
For well over a decade, legislation has been attempting to crack down on
criminals who have used this method to distribute and/or possess child
pornography.5 One of these legislative acts was the Child Pornography Prevention
Act of 1996 which considered possession of virtual child pornographypornography made with morphed computer images and without real children - a
crime.6 Unfortunately, the Supreme Court struck down this Act in 2002, declaring
that it was unconstitutional because of its infringement on the First Amendment. 7
Since then, legislation and the courts have continued to battle against virtual child
pornography while attempting to adhere to the limitations of the First Amendment.8
Recent developments in case law have once again called into question the
constitutionality of laws surrounding child pornography.9 Obviously, reconciling
the competing interests of the First Amendment with the prevention of the sexual
exploitation of children has proven to be a struggle which has yet to be completely
________________________

1.
J.D., Barry University Dwayne O. Andreas School of Law, 2011; B.S. in Psychology, University of
Central Florida, 2007.
2.
Marian Wright Edelman (The Founder and President of the Children Defense Fund).
3.
See generally Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, H.R. 3610 [hereinafter CPPA of 1996];
invalidated by Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002); Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to
end the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, 2003 Stat. 151 (2003) (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. §§§ 2252, 2252A, 2256 (2008) [hereinafter PROTECT Act of 2003].
4.
See Chelsea McLean, The Uncertain Fate of Virtual Child Pornography Legislation, 17 CORNELL J.L.
& PUB. POL’Y 221 (Fall 2007) [hereinafter McLean].
5.
See generally Id.
6.
CPPA of 1996, supra note 3.
7.
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002).
8.
See McLean, supra note 4.
9.
See generally United States v. Whorley, 550 F.3d 326 (4th Cir. 2008).

161
Published by Digital Commons @ Barry Law, 2011

1

Barry Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 1 [2011], Art. 5

Barry Law Review

162

Vol. 16

won by either side.10 In light of this tension, this article seeks to navigate through
the complexities involved with the uncertain future of virtual child pornography
laws. First, a brief history of the legislative actions and court rulings regarding
unprotected speech and virtual child pornography will be set forth. Then, a
discussion of the current standing of child pornography laws will be presented.
Entailed in this discussion will be a vigorous inspection of the current statutes and
how they simultaneously affect law enforcement, prosecutors, and defendants.
Finally, the potential future of laws regarding virtual child pornography will be
analyzed. This will necessarily include addressing the issues of how the
application and interpretation of the laws are changing and how the Supreme Court
might react to the criticisms of current legislation and case law.
II. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF CHILD PORNOGRAPHY
A. Forbidden Speech: Not all Speech is Protected
The Constitution grants the American people with the freedom of speech.11
However, it has long been recognized that the right of free speech is not an
absolute right devoid of limitations and restrictions.12 As stated in Chaplinsky v.
New Hampshire, a ground-breaking First Amendment case for its delineation of
what constitutes forbidden speech, “[t]here are certain well-defined and narrowly
limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been
thought to raise any Constitutional problem.”13 Included within these punishable
classes of speech are the lewd and obscene.14
B. The Initial Reaction to the Burgeoning Industry of Child Pornography
Unfortunately, laws prohibiting obscenity proved ineffective in eradicating the
proliferating industry of child pornography because not all child pornography fit
under the rubric of obscene materials.15 For example, in New York v. Ferber, the
defendant, Ferber, sold two films portraying young boys masturbating.16 Had
Ferber’s prosecution rested solely on laws prohibiting obscenity, he would have
managed to evade conviction because the sexual act of masturbation, in and of
itself, is not considered legally obscene.17 As a result, the Federal Government, as
well as a majority of the States, began enacting laws that forbade the distribution of
child pornography without the additional requirement that the material be legally
obscene.18 The Supreme Court approved of such legislation in Ferber, determining
________________________
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

See McLean, supra note 4.
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942).
Id. at 571-72.
Id. at 572.
See S. Rep. No. 95-438 (1977).
New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 752 (1982).
Id.
Id. at 749.
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that: 1) the State’s interest in ensuring the physical and psychological welfare of
children was “compelling;” 2) the distribution of child pornography is inherently
intertwined with the sexual abuse of children; 3) the distribution of child
pornography supplied an economic incentive and was therefore, a fundamental
component of the production of such materials - an activity already recognized as
illegal; 4) any value found in materials presenting children performing sexual acts
was slight, if not de minimis; and 5) distinguishing child pornography as an
unprotected class of speech was not “incompatible” with previous decisions.19 As
a result of these findings, the Court held that child pornography involving an
“element of scienter” and a visual portrayal of sexual conduct by children, and
lacking any serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value, is not protected
speech under the First Amendment.20
Criminalizing the production and distribution of child pornography, while a
valiant effort, proved insufficient to completely eliminate the market for child
pornography.21 Rather, the market simply went underground to compensate for the
attack on production and distribution, making it even more challenging to resolve
the child pornography crisis.22 In response, Congress enacted legislation banning
the mere possession, and not just production and distribution, of pornographic
images of children.23 In Osborne v. Ohio, the defendant argued that state of Ohio
could not constitutionally proscribe possession of child pornography since the
Supreme Court had previously stated in Stanley v. Georgia,24 a case involving the
possession of obscene materials, that “[w]hatever the power of the state to control
public dissemination of ideas inimical to the public morality, it cannot
constitutionally premise legislation on the desirability of controlling a person’s
private thoughts.”25 The Court responded to Osborne’s claims by asserting that the
State’s prohibition against possessing child pornography was not based on a
“paternalistic interest” in controlling Osborne’s mind, as it was in Stanley, but was
instead aimed at wiping out the exploitation of children.26 Accordingly, the
Supreme Court further endorsed the efforts of legislation to stamp out child
pornography by ruling that possession, and not just production and distribution,
could also be criminalized.27
C. …But Did Legislation Go Too Far?
Despite these efforts, however, sexual exploitation of children continued to run
rampant.28 In particular, the easy accessibility and increasing popularity of
________________________
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id. at 756-64.
Id. at 764-65.
See Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 110 (1990).
Id.
Id. at 143.
Stanley v. Georgia, 89 S.Ct. 1243 (1969).
Osborne, 495 U.S. at 108-09.
Id. at 109.
Id. at 111.
See Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002).
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computers created a wellspring for crimes, including the distribution, possession,
and with the powers of computer animation, even creation of child pornography
without actually utilizing children.29 In order to combat this new avenue made
available to pedophiles to exploit children and evade conviction, Congress passed
the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 which considered possession of
virtual child pornography - pornography made with morphed computer images and
without real children - a crime.30 In its findings, Congress determined that while
virtual child pornography may not involve, and therefore, does no actual, physical
harm to minors, these images still endanger children in indirect ways.31 For
instance, pedophiles could use this material to convince children to engage in
sexual activity by presenting the child with visual images portraying other children
participating in sexual acts and enjoying such activity. 32 Congress also found that
virtual child pornography has the potential to “whet … [the] sexual appetites” of
pedophiles, thus further fostering the creation and distribution of child pornography
and the sexual abuse of real children.33 Finally, Congress recognized that as
technology continued to advance, it would become more difficult to verify that
images contain real children, thereby supplying a viable defense which could be
used by pedophiles to escape prosecution.34
Eventually, opposition to the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996
caught the attention of the Supreme Court in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition.35
The Court countered each of Congress’s individual findings.36 First, while it was
conceded that virtual child pornography may indeed be employed by pedophiles to
lure children, the Court asserted that there are many other things innocent in
themselves, such as cartoons, toys, and candy, which could be used for the same
inappropriate purposes and yet it would not be expected for those items to be
prohibited.37 As to virtual child pornography whetting the appetites of pedophiles,
the Court contended that the government could not constitutionally base legislation
on the “mere tendency” of speech to promote illegal acts.38 The Court emphasized
that laws aimed at controlling the thoughts of individuals are impermissible,
specifically stating that “[t]he right to think is the beginning of freedom, and
speech must be protected from the government because speech is the beginning of
thought.”39 Concerning Congress’s final claim regarding the difficulties imposed
on prosecutors to prove that a real child, and not a virtual child, was used, the
Court argued that suppressing lawful speech (pornography using a digital image) as
a means to suppress unlawful speech (pornography using real children) cannot be
________________________
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id. at 239-40.
CPPA of 1996, supra note 3.
Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 241.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 242.
Id. at 239.
See Id. at 250-58.
Id. at 251.
Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 253.
Id.
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tolerated.40 All in all, the Court determined that laws proscribing virtual child
pornography were overbroad and infringed upon the First Amendment rights of
individuals.41
III. CURRENT STANDING OF CHILD PORNOGRAPHY
A. The PROTECT Act
With the demands placed by Free Speech Coalition, Congress rushed to craft
legislation which would adhere to the restrictions placed by the First Amendment
but would not compromise the objective of the Child Pornography Prevention Act
of 1996. They came up with the Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to end
the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003 (PROTECT Act), a compilation of
statutes aimed at preventing child abuse.42 The PROTECT Act, encompassing 18
U.S.C. §2252, 18 U.S.C. §2252A, and 18 U.S.C. §2256, prohibits the creation,
distribution, and possession of child pornography.43 Under these statutes, child
pornography is described as any visual depiction of sexually explicit conduct that
includes: a) a minor, b) a digital or computer image that is “indistinguishable” from
that of a real minor, or c) an image which has been created or modified to appear to
be that of an “identifiable minor” engaging in sexually explicit conduct.44 An
“identifiable minor” is defined as either a person who was under the age of
eighteen at the time the visual image was created or whose image as a minor was
employed in creating or modifying the visual image and that person is recognizable
as an actual person through the person’s face or some other distinctive
characteristic.45 A digital or computer image that is “indistinguishable” from that
of a real minor is described as being “virtually indistinguishable,” in that an
ordinary person viewing such image would come to the conclusion that the image
is of a real child.46 It is specifically stated that this definition excludes “depictions
that are drawings, cartoons, sculptures, or paintings depicting minors or adults.”47
B. An Avenue of Escape for Defendants
These subsequent alterations to child pornography supplied pedophiles with the
ammunition to avoid prosecution and, for those who had already been convicted, to
appeal their convictions. In United States v. Ellyson, the defendant was convicted
of possession of child pornography under the provisions of the Child Pornography
Prevention Act of 1996 after several computer disks containing sexually explicit
images of children of children, as well as other materials, were discovered at his
________________________
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id. at 255.
Id. at 258.
18 U.S.C. § 2252; 18 U.S.C. § 2252A; 18 U.S.C. § 2256.
Id.
18 U.S.C. § 2256(8).
18 U.S.C. § 2256(9).
18 U.S.C. § 2256(11).
Id.
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home.48 Ellyson appealed his conviction on the basis that the jury instruction
defined child pornography as “any visual depiction . . . of sexually explicit
conduct, where the production of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor
. . . engaging in sexually explicit conduct; or such visual depiction is, or appears to
be, of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct.”49 With this argument,
Ellyson successfully managed to have his conviction vacated and remanded
because of the possibility that he was convicted on the basis of possessing “virtual”
child pornography not containing an actual child, since the government did not
establish that a real child was harmed in making the images.50
The current parameters of child pornography laws are further explained by the
decision in United States v. Hilton.51 Hilton was convicted for possession of child
pornography under the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996.52 He appealed
his conviction, maintaining that the prosecution offered no proof that the
paraphernalia brought into evidence contained images of “actual” children and,
therefore, the images could simply be composed of fictitious, computer-generated
children, the possession of which is not illegal.53 Hilton’s conviction was
vacated.54 The court concluded that in order to maintain a conviction against a
defendant, the prosecution has the burden of proving that the image or images
contain actual children.55 It was emphasized that the government is not discharged
of its burden of proof merely because a defendant neglects to make an argument or
because of a lack of evidence suggesting the possible “artificiality” of the children
presented.56 Providing proof that the visual depictions utilize real children is an
element of the crime of possession, as well as production and distribution, of child
pornography which must be satisfied by the prosecution and which should not be
transferred to the defendant as an affirmative defense.57
C. The Burden on the Prosecution
These new strictures placed on the government had not only legal, but also
practical consequences. After all, taking into consideration that Congress itself
made a finding that “new photographic and computer imaging technologies make it
possible to produce . . . visual depictions of what appear to be children engaging in
sexually explicit conduct that are virtually indistinguishable to the unsuspecting
viewer from un-retouched photographic images of actual children,”58 how can
prosecutors prove that an image is abusing a real child versus a computer-generated
________________________

48.
United States v. Ellyson, 326 F.3d 522, 526 (4th Cir. 2003).
49.
Id.
50.
Id. at 535.
51.
United States v. Hilton, 386 F.3d 13 (1st Cir. 2004).
52.
Id. at 14.
53.
Id. at 14-19.
54.
Id. at 14.
55.
Id. at 18.
56.
Id.
57.
Id.
58.
Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. A, tit. I, § 121 (1)(5), 110 Stat.
3009-26. (emphasis added).
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creation? This triggered law enforcement to formulate some feasible solution. The
National Center for Missing and Exploited Children’s (NCMEC) Child Victim
Identification Program (CVIP) operates as the “national clearinghouse” for child
pornography cases.59 Law enforcement agencies can submit copies of the seized
images to CVIP and the evidence is analyzed.60 CVIP then returns a child
identification report to the law enforcement agency, listing which children have
been previously identified as real children.61 With prosecutors scrambling to verify
the actual identity of the children in the images so that there is no doubt as to
whether the visual depictions are real or creations, CVIP has performed a vital role
in convictions.62 However, while CVIP has indeed proved to be a great resolution
in identifying the realness of the victims, with the continuing advancements in
technology, it does not, and cannot, completely solve the problem of proving that
an image is not just a computer-generated creation.
D. Combining Obscenity Prohibitions with the PROTECT Act
The legislative branches have made further attempts to combat the use of these
defenses used by pedophiles by delving into the idea of including obscenity statutes
in the PROTECT Act.63 Created in the PROTECT Act is a new statute, 18 U.S.C.
§1466A, which employs the Miller standard for obscenity in cases involving
sexually explicit images of children.64 Section 1466A prohibits images of minors
that are “obscene,” regardless of whether the children are real and regardless of
what form of media, whether it be drawings, paintings, sculptures, etcetera, and
punishes those who violate the statute as if they had been convicted of a child
pornography crime.65 Correspondingly, 18 U.S.C. §1462 prohibits the
transportation of such materials as described in §1466A.66
IV. THE FUTURE OF VIRTUAL CHILD PORNOGRAPHY: COULD THE
APPLICATION AND INTERPRETATION OF THE LAWS BE CHANGING?
A. The First Signs of Leniency from the Courts
Although Free Speech Coalition certainly limits the abilities of Congress and
of law enforcement to convict creators, distributors, and possessors of child
pornography, courts actually seem almost unwilling to allow those indicted with
________________________

59.
Michelle K. Collins, Child Pornography: A Closer Look, POLICE CHIEF, Mar. 2007, available at
http://www.policechiefmagazine.org./magazine/index.cfm?fuseaction =display&article_id=1139&issue_id=32007.
60.
Id.
61.
Id.
62.
Id.
63.
Brian G. Slocum, VIRTUAL CHILD PORNOGRAPHY: DOES IT MEAN THE END OF THE CHILD
PORNOGRAPHY EXCEPTION TO THE FIRST AMENDMENT?, 14 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 637, 693 (2004).
64.
See 18 U.S.C. §1466A (2003); See also Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 26 (1973) (stating that “[a]t a
minimum, prurient, patently offensive depiction or description of sexual conduct must have serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value to merit First Amendment protection”).
65.
Id.
66.
18 U.S.C. §1462 (1996).
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these charges to escape conviction based upon the defense that the child or children
are not real.67 United States v. Irving, decided by the Second Circuit, is one such
recent case demonstrating the slackening restrictions that courts are imposing on
the government in establishing its case against pedophiles.68 The defendant was a
school physician convicted under the PROTECT Act for possession of seventy-six
video files of child pornography, as well as several other heinous child sexual
abuse charges.69 He appealed his conviction, insisting that the holding in Free
Speech Coalition essentially created a “bright-line rule” which requires the
prosecution to offer evidence, other than just the images themselves, to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that real children were abused in the images.70 The
Second Circuit rejected this argument, stating, “[a]lthough the Supreme Court
noted the possible evidentiary difficulty of distinguishing virtual and actual child
pornography, it did not establish a bright-line rule requiring that the government
proffer a specific type of proof to show the use of an actual child.”71 In effect, the
court essentially upheld a jury verdict convicting the defendant of possession of
child pornography based on videos where the government offered no proof beyond
the videos themselves that the images were of real children.72
Other Circuits have followed suit in relaxing the constraints placed on
prosecutors to establish that an actual child exists. In the First Circuit case, United
States v. Rodriguez-Pacheco, the defendant, Rodriguez-Pacheco, was sentenced to
thirty months imprisonment, followed by a three year supervised release after he
pleaded guilty to possession of child pornography as governed under the
PROTECT Act.73 In appealing the length of his sentence, Rodriguez-Pacheco
urged the court to conclude that the prosecution must be required to produce expert
testimony regarding the realness of a child in each image brought into evidence
before the government is deemed to have met its burden of proof.74 The court
decided that the premise of the defendant’s argument was erroneous.75 The court
reasoned that the issue of whether or not an image was created with a non-virtual
child is a question to be determined by the trier of fact, and as long as the
Government presents enough of a showing – this could simply be the images
themselves - to sway the trier of fact, then expert testimony is not an absolute
requirement.76

________________________

67.
See generally United States v. Irving, 452 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2006); United States v. RodriguezPacheco, 475 F.3d 434 (1st Cir. 2007); United States v. Hoey, 508 F.3d 687 (1st Cir. 2007).
68.
Irving, 452 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2006).
69.
Id.
70.
Id. at 121.
71.
Id.
72.
Id. at 120-22.
73.
Rodriguez-Pacheco, 475 F.3d 434 at 436 (1st Cir. 2007).
74.
Id.
75.
Id. at 437.
76.
Id. at 438; See Hoey, 508 F.3d 687 (1st Cir. 2007).
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B. United States v. Whorley: The First Case of its Kind
The lenient stance that several lower courts have taken in these cases, however,
does not compare to the glaring disregard of the Supreme Court’s rationale in Free
Speech Coalition, as does the case of United States v. Whorley.77 In this case, a
federal appeals panel affirmed the holding that child pornography is unlawful even
if the pictures are simply drawn, in the first conviction since the passing of the
2003 federal statute against such cartoons.78 Whorley was sentenced to twenty
years imprisonment after being found guilty of knowingly receiving twenty
Japanese anime-style cartoons portraying children engaging in sexually explicit
acts, receiving fourteen digital photographs with minors engaging in sexually
explicit acts, and sending, as well as receiving, twenty explicit emails about
fantasies of child molestation.79 To be precise, he was charged for being in
violation of the PROTECT Act, specifically under sections 1462, 2252(a)(2), and
1466A(a)(1), respectively, of the Act.80 On his appeal, Whorley made several
contentions, namely that §1462 and §1466A(a)(1) are facially unconstitutional. 81
As previously mentioned, §1462 is the prohibition of importing and transporting,
including knowingly receiving, obscene items through the use of “any express
company or other common carrier or interactive computer service for carriage in
interstate of foreign commerce.”82 Likewise, §1466A proscribes obscene visual
depictions showing the sexual abuse of children, expressly including drawings,
cartoons, sculptures, and paintings which appear to be of a child, as viable forms
of media covered under the statute.83 Section 1466A also proceeds to specifically
state that it is “not a required element . . . that the minor depicted actually
exist[s].”84 Whorley contended that based on the opinion of the Supreme Court in
Free Speech Coalition, although defamation, incitement, obscenity, and
pornography produced with actual children are not protected under the First
Amendment, a proscription against non-obscene items which do not use real
children is “impermissibly overbroad.”85 The Fourth Circuit responded by
concluding that in spite of the fact that §1466A(a)(1) does not require an actual
child, the inclusion of the requirement in the statute that the image be obscene is
sufficient to make it constitutional because the statute is then technically geared to
________________________

77.
See generally Whorley, 550 F.3d 326 (4th Cir. 2008).
78.
The Associated Press, 4th Circuit upholds law against cartoon child porn, Dec. 22, 2008, available at
http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/news.aspx?id=21040 (last visited Jan. 15, 2010).
79.
Whorley, 550 F.3d at 330.
80.
See generally 18 U.S.C. §1462, 18 USC §2252(a)(2), 18 USC §1466A(a)(1).
81.
Whorley, 550 F.3d at 330.
82.
18 U.S.C. §1462.
83.
18 U.S.C. §1466A (“Any person who . . . knowingly produces, distributes, receives, or possesses with
intent to distribute, a visual depiction of any kind, including a drawing, cartoon, sculpture, or painting, that-(1)(A) depicts a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct; and (B) is obscene; or (2)(A) depicts an image that
is, or appears to be, of a minor engaging in graphic bestiality, sadistic or masochistic abuse, or sexual intercourse,
including genital-genital, oral-genital, anal-genital, or oral-anal, whether between persons of the same or opposite
sex; and (B) lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value . . . shall be subject to the penalties
provided in section 2252A(b)(1) . . .”).
84.
18 U.S.C. §1466A(c).
85.
Whorley, 550 F.3d at 336.
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prohibit obscene speech, rather than child pornography.86 Thus, §1466A(a)(1)
escapes the requirement set out by the Supreme Court that there be an actual child
victim in the image by posing as a restriction on obscene speech, rather than a
restriction on child pornography.87
However, not all the judges in this case were of the same opinion that §1466A
retained its validity by shifting the focus from child pornography to obscenity. 88 In
fact, Circuit Judge Gregory, in his dissent, was of the strong opinion that Whorley
had a valid argument.89 He led off his robust support for Whorley’s claim of the
unconstitutionality of the statutes, stating that, “freedom of speech is ‘the highest
aspiration of the common people.’ Indeed, ‘[o]ur whole constitutional heritage
rebels at the thought of giving government the power to control men’s minds,’ and
simply because ‘society may find speech offensive is not a sufficient reason for
suppressing it.’”90 Judge Gregory did concede that even with the Supreme Court’s
refusal to impose a complete ban on virtual child pornography, it is still possible
for an individual to be convicted on the ability of a jury to make a finding that
cartoons of fictitious children are obscene.91 Nevertheless, he wrote at length about
the difficulties inherent with determining what is actually obscene.92 He expressed
his concern that the amorphous qualities of obscenity requirements make it a near
impossibility to meet the level of proof required in the criminal sector.93 He
averred that, as it stands, the Government is required to prove not only that the
“material appeal[s] to the prurient interest and that it . . . [is] patently offensive, but
also ‘call[s] on the prosecution to prove a negative, i.e., that the material was
utterly without redeeming social value--a burden virtually impossible to discharge
under our criminal standards of proof.’”94
Additionally, Judge Gregory had a significantly different understanding of the
language of §1466A compared to the majority.95 Disagreeing with the majority’s
contention that the statute covers pornographic articles of both real and fictitious
children, he insisted that a clear reading of §1466A(a)(1) demands that the
pornographic image include an actual minor engaging in sexually explicit acts, for
an individual to be charged with violating the statue.96 He denied the majority’s
line of reasoning by first alleging that 18 U.S.C. §2232 describes a minor as any
person under eighteen years old.97 A person, according to Black’s Law Dictionary,
is characterized as a “living human being” and as “a human being . . . with legal
________________________
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id. at 337.
Id.
See Id. at 343-53 (Gregory, Cir. Judge, dissenting and concurring).
See Id.
Id. at 343.
Id. at 347.
See Whorley, 550 F.3d at 343-53.
Id. at 344.
Whorley, 550 F.3d at 344 (Gregory, J., dissenting) (quoting Miller, 413 U.S. at 22).
Id. at 351.
Id.
Id.
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rights and duties.”98 As such, “[a] child that is a figment of an illustrator’s
imagination is not living, is not a human being with legal rights, and is certainly
not natural in the legal sense of the word.”99 Therefore, following this line of
thought, an individual’s conviction for receiving obscene, sexually explicit
caricatures of actual persons under eighteen years old would be entirely
appropriate, but a conviction for receiving obscene, sexually explicit drawings of
completely fictitious children would be a wholly different matter.100 Moreover,
Judge Gregory disputed the majority’s conclusion that §1466A(c), which states,
“[i]t is not a required element of any offense under this section that the minor
depicted actually exist,”101 indicates that the government is not required to prove
that the child shown in the image actually exists.102 Rather, he stressed the intent
of subsection §1466A(c), that the evidentiary proof necessary for an individual to
be found guilty be loosened by releasing the government from the insurmountable
task of identifying and locating the child or children used in the production of the
pornography and maintained that this did not mean that the child depicted could be
entirely fictitious.103 Instead, for example, it was meant to prevent an individual
from eluding conviction simply because a child did not “actually exist” in the sense
that the child had passed away, or the child simply could not be identified even
after an exhaustive search by law enforcement.104
Judge Gregory concluded his championing of Whorley’s claims by expressing
his deep concerns about the infringements placed on individuals’ First Amendment
rights, declaring:
Today, under the guise of suppressing obscenity -- whatever
meaning that term may encompass -- we have provided the
government with the power to roll back our previously inviolable
right to use our imaginations to create fantasies. It is precisely this
unencumbered ability to fantasize that has allowed this nation to
reap the benefits of great literary insight and scientific invention.
The Constitution’s inviolable promise to us is its guarantee to
defend thought, imagination and fantasy from unlawful
governmental interference regardless of whether such thoughts,
imaginings, or fantasies are popular with the masses. It is in these
moments that our grip on the rule of law and our fidelity to
constitutional values is tested.105
________________________

98.
Whorley, 550 F.3d at 351 (Gregory, J., dissenting) (quoting WEBSTER’S II NEW RIVERSIDE
UNIVERSITY DICTIONARY 877 (1994); See also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1178 (8th ed. 2004) (defining a
person as “a human being”).
99.
Whorley, 550 F.3d at 351 (Gregory, J., dissenting).
100.
Id.
101.
18 USC §1466A(c).
102.
Whorley, 550 F.3d at 351.
103.
Id.
104.
Id.
105.
Id. at 353.
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Despite the support Whorley had from Judge Gregory, on December 18, 2008
his convictions were affirmed. 106 Whorley then filed a petition for rehearing en
banc which was also firmly denied on June 15, 2009.107 Once again, however, he
received further encouragement by Judge Gregory who urged Whorley to seek a
grant of certiorari from the Supreme Court.108 Whorley took his advice and
petitioned the Supreme Court to review his case.109 On January 11, 2010, the
Supreme Court denied Whorley’s petition for writ of certiorari.110
C. Others Question the Constitutionality of §1462 & §1466A of the
PROTECT Act
Although Whorley may have been the first to be convicted under 18 U.S.C.
§1462 and 18 U.S.C. §1466A, sections enacted as a way to avoid the limitations
forced on 18 U.S.C. §2252 and 18 U.S.C. §2252A by the finding in Free Speech
Coalition,111 other convictions, and as a result, a string of appeals, have sprung up
in the wake of Whorley. In United States v. Ryan, a Second Circuit case, the
defendant appealed his conviction on the basis of the unconstitutionality of 18
U.S.C. §1466A because the statute is overbroad.112 “Under the First Amendment’s
overbreadth doctrine, ‘a statute is facially invalid if it prohibits a substantial
amount of protected speech.’”113 Ryan attacked the validity of the statute by
highlighting the fact that the statute extends to the mere possession of materials
which do not involve real children and as such, there is no actual victim and
therefore, no crime.114 The court, however, disagreed, citing that the fact that 18
U.S.C. §1466A requires that the material be obscene is sufficient to protect it from
being considered overbroad.115
Likewise, in United States v. Mees, defendant Matthew Mees posed a similar
argument to the Eighth Circuit challenging the constitutionality of 14 U.S.C.
§1466A.116 Mees maintained that proscribing images depicting fictional characters
cannot be enforced since characters in drawings have no age and, thus, it is not
feasible to make an accurate determination of the definite age of a non-existent
individual.117 As such, it is impractical to expect a jury to make a legitimate
finding of fact concerning this issue at trial.118 The court responded by
emphasizing that the issue of age is an element that the Government must prove
________________________

106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
10, 2009).
117.
118.

Id. at 343.
United States v. Whorley, 569 F.3d 211 (4th Cir. 2009), denying reh’g to 550 F.3d 326 (4th Cir. 2008).
Id. at 214 (Gregory, J., dissenting).
Whorley v. United States, 30 S.Ct. 1052 (2010), denying cert. to 550 F.3d 326 (4th Cir. 2008).
Id.
Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 258.
United States v. Ryan, No. 2:07-CR-35, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53644, at *23(D. Vt. May 26, 2009).
Id. at 23-24 (citing United States v. Williams, 128 S. Ct. 1830, 1838 (2008)).
Id. at 23.
Id. at 24.
United States v. Mees, No. 4:09CR00145 ERW, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48801, at *3 (E.D. Mo. June
Id.
Id. at 3-4.
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beyond a reasonable doubt, and simply because a jury may find it difficult to
ascertain the age of a fictional character does not, by itself, make the statute
unconstitutional.119 Still, Mees continued his defense by then asserting that an
individual has a constitutional right to merely possess obscene materials.120 He
delineated this claim by pointing to the fact that the Supreme Court has previously
concluded that the First and Fourteenth Amendments entitle individuals to be free
from prohibitions against the mere private possession of obscene materials.121 The
court countered his claim, stating that the statute which the defendant is charged
with and is currently challenging “does not make mere possession of obscene
material a crime; rather, the statute requires some connection to interstate
commerce.”122 Thus, the defendant is not simply being charged with the mere
possession of obscene material.123 Instead, he has been charged with “possessing
obscene material that was produced using materials that traveled in interstate
commerce.”124
D. The Plausibility of the Supreme Court Reviewing the Issue
As it currently stands, these defendants have failed in their arguments to
adequately contest the constitutionality of the §1466A portion of the PROTECT
Act. Nonetheless, with the fairly recent influx of cases, such as Whorley, Ryan,
and Mees, which use §1466A as a way around the mandates of Free Speech
Coalition, it is entirely plausible that the Supreme Court would want to review the
issue. It is also important to point out that even though there has been nearly a
decade since the enactment of the PROTECT Act, there was a six-year span
between the Child Pornography Prevention Act and the Supreme Court’s decision
that it was unconstitutional in Free Speech Coalition. In fact, individuals in the
forefront of the battle against the sexual exploitation of children suggest that the
recent achievements of the prosecution of these pedophiles may not be as
triumphant as it first seems.125 Justin Fitzsimmons, a former prosecutor and senior
attorney with the National Center for the Prosecution of Child Abuse, disclosed
reservations about the actual success or failure of these prosecutions since the cases
have just begun to be challenged.126 Ernie Allen, the President of the National
Center for Missing and Exploited Children, also expressed the uncertainty of the
future of child pornography laws and the prosecution of those violating them. 127
After all, while these prosecutorial and legislative efforts have proved triumphant
so far in attaining convictions, many of these cases are still in the appellate
________________________

119.
Id. at 9.
120.
Id. at 11-12.
121.
Mees, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48801, at *12; see Stanley, 89 S. Ct. at 1249.
122.
Id.
123.
Id.
124.
Id.
125.
See Ashley Broughten, Tennessee Man Charged in ‘Virtual Pornography’ Case, June 25, 2009,
available at http://edition.cnn.com/2009/CRIME/06/24/virtual.child.porn.
126.
Id.
127.
Id.
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process.128 With the continued perseverance of these defendants appealing their
convictions by consistently disclaiming the constitutionality of the PROTECT Act,
their arguments are bound to capture the attention of the Supreme Court.
E. Should the Supreme Court Review the Issue?
As pointed out above, it is certainly plausible that with the recent arrival of
cases prosecuted under §1466A of the PROTECT Act, the Supreme Court may
want to review the constitutionality of the Act. However, simply because it is a
possibility that the Court may want to assess the situation, does not necessarily
mean that the Court should, in fact, do so. Therefore, the question must be asked,
should the Supreme Court review the issue? Clearly, there is a clash in the
interpretation of the laws regarding virtual child pornography. The Supreme Court
previously made it clear in Free Speech Coalition that the First Amendment
interests of individuals prevents a complete ban on child pornography which did
not include real children.129 However, the moral reprehensibility inherent in the
production and possession of such material, even though there is no real victim,
makes it impossible for society to simply let it go unpunished. As a result,
legislation, as well as the lower courts, has found ways around the mandates set
forth in the Supreme Court’s original ruling in Free Speech Coalition.130 The
issues which have been introduced thus far indicate the vital need for the Supreme
Court to re-evaluate how virtual child pornography should be dealt with, if for no
other reason than to clear up the confusion and alleviate the frustration currently
running rampant amongst law enforcement, prosecutors, and defendants. A
balance must be struck between our constitutional rights and our desire to protect
our children. And as such, it is imperative that the Supreme Court review the
constitutionality of section 1466A of the PROTECT Act in order to guide how
legislation and the lower courts should respond to virtual child pornography.
F. If Reviewed, How Would the Supreme Court Resolve the Issue?
If the Supreme Court does reanalyze this issue, will the PROTECT Act pass
constitutional muster? Does cloaking portions of this Act under the guise of
obscenity laws protect it from being deemed unconstitutional, as the Child
Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 was inevitably judged to be? Because of the
amorphous quality of what obscenity is composed of, it is impossible to predict.
As Justice Brennan formerly noted, “[t]he problem is . . . that one cannot say with

________________________

128.
Id.
129.
Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 244.
130.
See 18 USC §1466A; 18 USC §1462; Irving, 452 F.3d at 110 (2006); Rodriguez-Pacheco, 475 F.3d at
434 (2007); Hoey, 508 F.3d at 687 (2007); Whorley, 550 F.3d at 326 (2008); Ryan, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53644,
at *1 (2009); and Mees, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48801, at *1 (2009).
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certainty that material is obscene until at least five members of [the Supreme]
Court, applying inevitably obscure standards, have pronounced it so.”131
The Supreme Court has addressed the issue of what materials are obscene by
delineating which elements must be met in order for a material to be lawfully
deemed obscene in Miller v. California.132 The three-part Miller test asks:
(a) whether the average person, applying contemporary community
standards would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to
the prurient interest; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a
patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the
applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole,
lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.133
The chances that a jury would determine any visual representation of the
sexual abuse of a child, whether the child be real or fictitious, to not meet the
standards of obscenity is definitely slim. After all, few other acts raise the same
degree of condemnation than the abuse of children, especially the sexual abuse of
children. And, without a doubt, the fierceness with which we guard our nation’s
children is something to be commended.
But can it really be this simple to preclude pedophiles from finding refuge in
the safeguards of First Amendment rights? The answer is doubtful for multiple
reasons. First, if it was this simple, then what was the whole point of categorizing
child pornography as a completely distinct class of unprotected speech apart from
obscenity? Why not stick with the original classes of unprotected speech - the
lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or “fighting” words if it is sufficient to combat the sexual exploitation of children just by obscenity
laws?134 One reason is because of the demanding impositions that the Supreme
Court has previously placed on obscenity laws as compared to child pornography
laws.135 For example, when it comes to obscene materials, the government is
required to use “rigorous procedural safeguards” prior to seizing any material
which it deems to be obscene.136 In fact, obscene material may not be removed
from circulation until an adversarial hearing concerning the material is made and
an official determination that the material is obscene has been declared.137 Just the
contrary is true with child pornography.138 Since child pornography is provided
less constitutional protection than obscenity, a prior adversarial hearing is not
________________________

131.
Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 93 S. Ct. 2628 (1973) (Brennan J. dissenting); see also Miller, 413 U.S.
at 29 (agreeing with Justice Brennan’s assessment and noting that the absence of a single standard for testing
obscenity has strained both the federal and state courts).
132.
Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
133.
Id.
134.
See Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572.
135.
Slocum, supra note 63, at 695.
136.
Id.
137.
Id.
138.
Id.
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required before the government is allowed to seize all copies of the suspected child
pornography.139
Additionally, while the Supreme Court has previously determined that an
individual can be convicted for the mere possession of child pornography in
Osborne,140 the Court has chosen the alternate when it comes to obscenity.141 In
Stanley, the appellant was charged and convicted for “knowingly hav[ing]
possession of . . . obscene matter.”142 The Supreme Court ruled that the First and
Fourteenth Amendments proscribe lawmakers from making the mere private
possession of obscene materials illegal.143 The Supreme Court’s perspective on
possession of obscene materials is perhaps most succinctly expressed by the Court
when it quoted Judge Herbert of the Supreme Court of Ohio:
I cannot agree that mere private possession of . . . [obscene]
literature by an adult should constitute a crime. The right of the
individual to read, to believe or disbelieve, and to think without
governmental supervision is one of our basic liberties, but to
dictate to the mature adult what books he may have in his own
private library seems to the writer to be a clear infringement of his
constitutional rights as an individual.144
Therefore, under the reasoning in Stanley, using obscenity laws as a guise to
prohibit virtual child pornography is insufficient due to the inability of lawmakers
to proscribe simple possession of obscene materials.145
As of yet, the implications of Stanley have been ignored as it concerns §1466A.
The constitutionality of §1466A has, at least so far with the district and appellate
courts, not been determined to be inadequate because it technically proscribes
obscene child pornography from traveling through interstate or foreign commerce.
Section 1466A(a) forbids any person from knowingly producing, distributing,
receiving, or possessing with the intent to distribute obscene child pornography,
whether a real or fictitious child exists.146 Each of these actions is deeply
connected with commerce.147 However, §1466A(b) states that any person who
knowingly possesses, even without an intent to later distribute, obscene
pornographic material of children can also be charged with violating the
PROTECT Act.148 All that is required by §1466A(b) is that the visual depiction
acquired had travelled by any means of interstate or foreign commerce, including
________________________

139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Id.
Osborne, 495 U.S. at 112.
See Stanley, 394 U.S. at 568.
Id. at 558.
Id. at 568.
Id. at 562 n.7 (quoting State v. Map, 166 N.E.2d 387, 393 (Ohio 1960) (Herbert, J. dissenting)).
McLean, supra note 4, at 243.
18 U.S.C. §1466A(a).
See 18 U.S.C. §1466A(d).
18 U.S.C. §1466A(b).
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through the computer.149 This is actually how charges were imposed on
Whorley.150 He received the cartoons through an email.151 To say the least, this
connection to commerce seems tenuous at best. Does a personal email really have
any effect on interstate or foreign commerce? Furthermore, with our current
dependence on technology and with the ease of communicating information over
state borders, is it truly even feasible to possess materials which have absolutely no
connection to interstate of foreign commerce? It is certainly plausible that the
Supreme Court would side with the arguments that these recent appellants have
made, that a right to possess inherently includes a right to receive since it is nearly
impossible to acquire a material without some connection to interstate or foreign
travel.
V. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, with the Supreme Court having previously decided that the
language in the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, which simply
conveyed that an individual could be prohibited from producing, distributing, or
possessing child pornography depicting an image which appeared to be that of a
minor, the future of these portions of the PROTECT Act is uncertain at best. 152
The conduct portrayed in virtual child pornography is despicable and it is certainly
hard to fathom any redeeming quality in such materials. Nonetheless, as the
Supreme Court originally noted in Free Speech Coalition, the original purpose of
categorizing child pornography as a separate class of unprotected speech was the
compelling government interest in protecting children.153 And since there are no
actual victims in drawings or computer-generated images, then a statute
proscribing such images sweeps too broadly and oversteps the Constitution’s
bounds.

________________________

149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

18 U.S.C. §1466A(d).
Whorley, 550 F.3d at 331.
Id.
See generally Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 234.
Id. at 241.
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